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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

**Enhancing Joint Mission Execution by Improving Joint Task Force Command**

by  
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Army or the Department of the Navy.

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***To better meet future warfare challenges, DOD must develop the ability to integrate combat organizations with forces capable of responding rapidly to events that occur with little or no warning...The forces must be highly networked with joint command and control, and they must be better able to integrate into combined operations than the forces of today.***<sup>1</sup>

Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001

## **Introduction**

The recent QDR repeats a long-standing refrain of American defense policy concern: the United States armed forces need to execute joint operations better. Since 1986, the United States' armed services have improved their ability to work closely together to achieve military success. There remain, however, many examples of friction and inefficiency in execution that hamper military effectiveness.

Important elements of this problem include the structure and processes of joint organizations. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is well designed to ensure that service pluralism has a strong and effective role in the planning process. In execution, however, the system seems poorly suited to generate the synergy that is one of the central tenets of operational art.<sup>2</sup> In practice, joint command and control of major operations frequently reflects the division of tasks among services with little overlap or with only minimal augmentation from the other services. The actual joint integration of service and functional components has been ad hoc and uneven.

To enhance the effective execution of joint military operations, this paper advances two recommendations that can provide immediate benefits to the unified geographic combatant commanders. First, I endorse the effort by the Department of Defense to create standing joint task force headquarters (SJTF HQ) for each regional unified command. This paper provides some specific suggestions concerning key features these headquarters should have to enhance joint execution. Second, recognizing the benefits of these standing JTF headquarters as well as the emerging imperatives

of network-centric warfare, this paper recommends eliminating the requirement for component and functional commands within joint task forces.

This paper provides a brief background section that describes some difficulties in joint execution from recent joint operations. The paper then provides a brief analysis of problems and concludes with recommendations for improving the execution of joint operations.

## **Background**

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.<sup>3</sup> The act was intended to address some of the glaring deficiencies in joint operations that had been exhibited in military operations—such as the spectacular failure of the 1980 Desert One rescue attempt in Iran and the poorly synchronized and clumsily executed invasion of Grenada in 1983.<sup>4</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Act made major changes to the defense establishment that have gone a long way towards realizing the benefits of jointness while maintaining strong service identities. In particular, the act strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, commensurately, the Joint Staff. It also enhanced the role of the unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).<sup>5</sup>

Since 1986, U.S. armed forces have conducted several successful joint operations. Most prominently, the U.S. armed forces deserve great credit for joint success in combat operations in Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999) and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan (2001-2002). Joint integration has also been important in numerous military operations other than war (e.g., Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo).

Nonetheless, major military operations since Goldwater-Nichols illustrate the continuing problems of interservice rivalry and inefficiency. In major military operations since Goldwater-Nichols,



significant problems with joint execution can be traced to poorly designed or poorly used command and control structures. Rather than relying on joint headquarters to direct joint operations, service and functional components have been given responsibility for discrete portions of operations. Execution of joint operations suffered due to lack of close integration and coordination of service and functional component operations. The following section provides some examples from combat actions in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation to illustrate problems of joint execution.

### ***Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm)***

In Operation Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf divided responsibility for execution among the different service components of the joint and combined force.<sup>6</sup> These components were dominated by a particular service with minimal augmentation from other services or components.<sup>7</sup> This approach minimized service rivalry by giving each service a piece of the operational pie. In essence, each component fought its own battle.

...in Schwarzkopf's command, the war plan was joint more in name than in fact. Each service was allowed to attack the way it preferred, with little thought about how an attack in one area would affect the fighting in another.<sup>8</sup>

The joint and combined operation was ultimately successful, however, not without some important costs. For example, the secondary attack by the Marine in eastern Kuwait achieved too much success and should have been better orchestrated as part of the overall plan. "Far from fixing the Iraqis in place, the Marine attack had roused them out of the Kuwait theater, undermining the Army attack plan, which Schwarzkopf himself believed had been too slow."<sup>9</sup> By continuing to press the Iraqi forces and exploit their initial success, the Marines pushed the Iraqis back in a manner that diminished the effect of the VII Corps' flanking attack—the ground attack's main effort—which was meant to trap

the Iraqi Republican Guards.<sup>10</sup> Too much success in the supporting attack allowed the Iraqis to escape with a greater portion of their force intact.<sup>11</sup>

Another example of problems in joint operations during Desert Storm was the poor coordination between air and ground forces concerning the placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Rather than work closely together to coordinate air and ground operations for complementary effects, air and ground commanders instead sought to use the FSCL to gain control over a portion of the battlefield to better suit the flexibility of their forces. The result was the poor placement of the FSCL in a manner that allowed Iraqi ground forces greater protection from the effects of airpower and hence the ability to withdraw units and equipment from the Kuwait theater in the closing stages of the ground war.

A doctrinal technicality and inertia took precedence over common sense. The Army and the Air Force had trumpeted their ability to coordinate the “air-land” battle. In the final fourteen chaotic hours of the war, however, the FSCL had been pushed back and forth as the two services sought maximum flexibility for their own forces.<sup>12</sup>

Additionally, prior to the ground war, ground force commanders were often disappointed that targets they nominated for air attack were often not integrated into the air tasking order (ATO). This reflected a disconnect between the interests and priorities of the joint force air component commander (made up of elements providing aircraft) and the interests of other components with a demand for the effects air power could provide. By leaving this responsibility in the hands of a component commander, overall priorities of the joint force were sometimes sacrificed.<sup>13</sup> This illustrates the problems of giving each service a specific sector within which they could control their own operations. During Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf did not intervene to ensure the closer integration of the air and ground forces.

After the war, Schwarzkopf said he knew little about the debate. It was another example of how joint warfare fell short and how the services' ability to work together suffered from Schwarzkopf's inattention.<sup>14</sup>

This incident also illustrates the difficulty of the combatant commander remaining too closely involved in operational matters while also trying to manage the complex strategic and political tasks incumbent with his position. Although it is certainly the CINC's prerogative, creation of a joint task force might have been appropriate to help resolve this tension.

### ***Kosovo (Operation Allied Force)***

There were notable flaws in the joint command and control structure during the 1999 NATO operations related to the situation in Kosovo. This included the creation, at the last minute, of a Joint Task Force HQs (JTF Noble Anvil) using as its core a US headquarters, USNAVEUR, untrained for warfighting leadership.<sup>15</sup> As with other potential core HQs that could have been designated as JTF HQ, USNAVEUR was dominated by one service, in this case the Navy.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, to make the JTF HQ functional required significant augmentation of personnel from other commands and the reserves.<sup>17</sup> This created a headquarters to manage combat operations that was ad hoc and unevenly staffed.

Further complicating the command and control structure for Operation Allied Force, an Army task force centered on 24 Apache helicopters (Task Force Hawk), was deployed to Albania from Germany. Concerned that Army Apache helicopters would be misused by the Air Force JFACC, the Army deployed a Corps headquarters with a three-star Army general (same rank as JFACC) to oversee the Army efforts of a brigade size task force (usually commanded by a Colonel). When the force of Apaches and artillery were initially committed to the theater, the Apaches were not included in the Air Tasking Order.<sup>18</sup> There were still integration problems even after integration of the Apaches into the ATO began.

Coordinating rotary-wing aircraft operations into the Air Tasking Order proved problematic because this is not a traditional mission defined in Army doctrine nor is it exercised on a regular basis in joint training. As a result, the Services had to work through numerous complexities associated with the evolution of new missions and employment concepts in the middle of a major conflict. Integrating Army helicopters, radars, artillery, and other assets through the Air Tasking Order requires significant refinement.<sup>19</sup>

As the conflict continued, there was also evidence that the valuable intelligence developed by Task Force Hawk was poorly used by the JFACC. Even though Task Force




Figure 1: NATO Command and Control Structure for Operation Allied Force<sup>20</sup>

Hawk was not able to commit its Apache helicopters to battle, their assets did provide a useful source of intelligence, particularly with respect to the KLA forces fighting with the Serbian armed forces near the border with Yugoslavia. Army radars and Apaches with Task Force Hawk were able to observe Serbian movements and were able to track Serbian mortar and artillery fire. They were also in contact with the Albanian Army which had other sources of intelligence about the ongoing battle between the

KLA and Serbian forces.<sup>21</sup> With emphasis and encouragement from General Clark (CINC EUCOM and SACEUR),<sup>22</sup> Admiral Ellis (Commander NAVFAC and AFSOUTH),<sup>23</sup> the operational commander, was able to improve the use of air assets to attack targets developed by TF Hawk.<sup>24</sup> The system was an ad hoc arrangement that remained inefficient for the smooth integration of both elements.<sup>25</sup>

There was no attempt to place all combat operations in the Kosovo area under a single command and control headquarters to which all other elements would be in a supporting role.<sup>26</sup> Separate US and NATO command relationships also complicated the picture (for example, in figure 1, note that the NATO land component commander, LTG Jackson, did not have any control over the US Army elements in TF Hawk, which were subordinate to the US-only JTF Noble Anvil chain of command).

### **Analysis: Problems of Joint Execution**

The JOPES system is well designed to ensure the broadest possible participation in the planning and execution system for elements of the defense establishment. The Joint planning and execution community (JPEC) ensures the representation and consideration of service and component perspectives (see figure 2). In deliberate planning, the diversity of service and component perspectives provides valuable benefits. Key benefits include the identification and consideration of competing alternatives to accomplish military tasks. Competition among various advocates and differing perspectives can create a range of feasible options from which commanders can identify preferred courses of action. The diversity generated by the existence of separate armed services with distinct and clear missions is valuable.<sup>27</sup> During the deliberate planning process, the scope for diversity should be wide and comprehensive.




Figure 2: JPEC<sup>28</sup>

During crisis action planning and during execution, streamlined, efficient and effective processes must rapidly generate the plans and actions to succeed. Time for deliberation and collegiality is at a minimum and the finely honed reactions of a coherent, competent command structure are imperative.

The virtues of joint operations are legion and well established throughout history. The combination of military capabilities within and among sea, land and air forces is indisputable. Also indisputable is the importance of unity of command and unity of effort to effective mission accomplishment. Hence, jointness on the battlefield provides an undeniably positive benefit that we seek to maximize.

The examples of Desert Storm and Allied Force described above are merely illustrations of problems in joint command and control. I chose them because they represent the most demanding combat operations of recent experience. There are many other examples in other operations—some executed and some merely planned—that provide additional evidence of the problems of ad hoc command and control structures. Among military operations other than war (MOOTW) the operation in Somalia is an example of multiple, overlapping and poorly integrated command and control arrangements.<sup>29</sup>

In execution, the principal method of establishing joint command and control has been the designation of the commander of the dominant service to assume command of the joint force. Within the joint command, service components have been given specific areas of operations with little or no overlap. Each service therefore has its own area of responsibility.<sup>30</sup> This lack of overlap was illustrated earlier concerning the Marine attack in Desert Storm, the poor management of the FSCL between the Army and Air Force during Desert Storm, and the poor integration of Task Force Hawk during Allied Force. Rather than orchestration of operations with one, central focus, operations have more closely resembled coordination exercises where component or service commanders maintain separate sectors of responsibility.

The proliferation of military specialties, tactical units, and equipment reflect the advancing complexity and sophistication of the means for armed conflict. Mastering the tasks and skills of these vastly different capabilities supports the need for diverse structures to organize, train and equip the personnel and units that will employ these skills. The services do this well. We achieve synergy, however, when we orchestrate these capabilities in complementary ways. We need to do this better. One way to do this is to integrate our command and control structures to better achieve joint synergy. This can be accomplished by creating standing joint task force headquarters in each geographic unified command. Furthermore, with strong service representation within the standing joint task force headquarters, the requirement for separate service component or functional commanders can be eliminated.

### **Recommendations**

***Recommendation #1: Create robust, standing joint task force headquarters (SJTF HQ) that can command and control the execution of major operations on short notice.***

The 2001 QDR states that DOD

...will develop over the next several months proposals to establish a prototype for Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters. The goal is to establish a SJTF headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands. The headquarters will provide uniform, standard operation procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise among commands.<sup>31</sup>

Specific proposals for the structure and composition of these standing joint task force headquarters have yet to be published.<sup>32</sup>

The creation of such standing headquarters is probably the single best way to improve joint execution of major operations. The creation of a JTF below the level of the combatant commander is a valuable way to provide focused leadership for a clearly defined task<sup>33</sup> thereby leaving the CINC free for overall direction of efforts within his area of responsibility.

In current and recent practice, the staff for a JTF is typically the staff of the service HQs designated to lead the JTF—normally a fleet, Corps, or numbered Air Force staff.<sup>34</sup> The joint character of the staff usually comes from the augmentation of specialists from CINCs assets (e.g., DJTFAC) and the attachment of liaison personnel from the other services.<sup>35</sup> This ad hoc arrangement creates disparities in experience, standard operation procedures, and staff cohesion. The time sensitive nature of execution places enormous demands on such ad hoc organizations. More frequently, the operation retains the definition and flavor of the service that provided the JTF commander who, in turn, relies on the staff with which he is already familiar. Lack of joint team training and cohesion is most relevant in the start up and initial phases of operations. In low or no warning situations, this lack of experience and training creates a major risk to mission accomplishment. The current commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, General William F. Kiernan notes that,



The power of a standing joint task force [headquarters] is that you get people assigned for three or four years, they develop their staff procedures, they get to know one another, and there's a personal relationship that enables them to do things fairly quickly.<sup>36</sup>

To ensure joint effectiveness and unity of effort, the standing joint task force headquarters must be a robust, well trained, cohesive organization around which a Joint Task Force can be built. To do this, the standing joint task force HQ should be able to assume control of any combat situation or smaller-scale contingency that takes place within a regional combatant command. This includes the presence and training of the JTF commander as an individual separate from the service components. In other words, the JTF commander should not be the commander of a subordinate service elements such as an Army Corps, Navy Fleet or other operational service component within a combatant command region.

The Standing JTF commanders should be assigned to the regional combatant commands to work closely with the CINCs they will support. One approach would be to assign this individual as assistant commander-in-chief (ACINC), SJTF. The ACINC, SJTF should have three-star flag rank. He should have a permanent, joint staff assigned to him in order to assume immediate command and control of a JTF in a crisis or other short warning situation. The ACINC SJTF should be senior to the commanders of operational level service forces apportioned to the combatant command (which are generally no higher than Corps or Fleet equivalent). The ACINC SJTF position should be a joint critical billet and must be filled by an individual designated as a joint specialty officer (JSO)—moreover this should be a JSO who did not require a waiver.<sup>37</sup> In peacetime, the members of the HQ, SJTF should be part of the combatant command's staff but should regularly train and operate as an independent element that can be detached from the combatant command staff without disturbing overall

operations.<sup>38</sup> In peace or non-crisis situations, the SJTF personnel provide useful depth to the combatant commander's staff. They must not, however, become staff action officers. They must not be indispensable for other combatant command tasks if activated to perform joint task force headquarters duties. For limited war or small-scale contingencies, the SJTF HQ provides the CINC the flexibility to assume command and control of service forces for mission execution and still retain his primary staff for overall combatant command responsibilities. In other words, the JTF can execute a mission within a subset of the CINC's geographic region. The SJTF staff becomes the established hub into which the assigned elements of the JTF plug in. Furthermore, in situations where the CINC decides to retain overall command and control of an operation—such as General Schwarzkopf did in Desert Storm—the SJTF commander and staff still provide useful capabilities to the CINC that can be used to manage operational level command and control of forces and leave the CINC free to focus on theater-strategic or political concerns.

In situations where the SJTF is activated, the SJTF HQ becomes the central processing unit (CPU) of the operation. Service forces (Corps, fleets, Marine Amphibious units, air expeditionary forces, etc) should be able to join the JTF and operate as easily as a plug-and-play component added to a personal computer. To do this effectively, the standing JTF staff must include service specific operations and logistics coordination elements. Ultimately, these elements of the JTF staff will coordinate closely with the Service components of the combatant command. With respect to logistics, this is a requirement since services provide the specific logistical requirements for their forces.<sup>39</sup> Within the J3 (operations) and J5 (plans), each service must provide strong officers who can effectively represent their services.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, within the J4, the services must provide officers who can integrate service specific supply and acquisition systems into the joint task force's requirements. This will easily

and effectively meet the requirements outlined in joint doctrine. That is, "...the commander of a JTF will have a joint staff with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command."<sup>41</sup> The core of this standing JTF staff should be approximately 75-100 individuals on a full time basis. Critical elements include a joint primary staff (that is, strong representation from the individual Services) as well as integrated joint teams within key staff sections (for example, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations elements within the J3, J4 and J5 directorates). Upon activation of a JTF, they will likely require augmentation of technical specialists (e.g., intelligence analysts and communications specialists) to permit high tempo, 24 hour operations. Augmentees may also include reserves or individuals from other combatant commands (such as joint forces command).<sup>42</sup> With a strong joint staff with representatives from each of the services, it should also be possible to flatten the organizational hierarchy. That leads to my next recommendation.

***Recommendation #2: Eliminate Requirements for Service and functional component commanders within Joint Task Forces.***

In mission execution, the joint task force commander should have broad latitude to establish command relationships. To streamline the chain of command and facilitate rapid execution, flatter organizational hierarchies are valuable. These flatter command structures are also better suited to exploiting the emerging concepts of network centric warfare and the information advantages of the computer driven revolution in military affairs.<sup>43</sup>

Currently, joint forces are required to have service component commanders. In accordance with Joint Publication 0-2, "All joint forces include service components, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through service components."<sup>44</sup> It is possible to

accomplish the intent of maintaining clear linkages to service-specific logistics networks without necessarily requiring an intermediate level of command. Instead, these coordination requirements could be moved to the JTF staff directorates, particularly the J4 (as described in recommendation #1 above).

The imperatives for streamlined joint command and control architectures and standing organizations for execution are consistent with the expected demands of network centric warfare (NCW). Network centric warfare recognizes the need for speed of communication and the ability to act and decide within the enemy's decision cycle.

New approaches to command and new command arrangements are needed to effectively flatten hierarchies, free information flow (not orders) from the chain of command, and enable the enterprise to increase the speed of command to lock out adversarial options and achieve option dominance.<sup>45</sup>

The ability to generate a common operating picture and achieve self-synchronization in support of the CJTF's intent provides a strong argument against the maintenance of multiple layers of redundant command and control. In this concept, the JTF commander and his staff would serve less as the coordinator for service and functional commands and instead would orchestrate the actions of subordinate sea, land and air assets under direct command and supervision of the JTF commander and his staff. Such orchestration would occur through mission-type orders and clear understanding of the commander's intent--not micromanagement of subordinate units. In place of component and functional elements working in different stove pipes under the leadership of service commanders, the services and components would be represented on the JTF staff within the existing structure (e.g., service-oriented sub elements within the J3, J4 and J5 sections). For example, a typical service cell within the J3, J4 and J5 would be approximately 3-5 individuals. This provides each service the capacity for 24 hour

operations within the directorates as well as the potential for diversity within the service representatives.<sup>46</sup> The joint staff is therefore not an array of purple-suited officers but a strong combination of service experts more analogous to a strong blade of Damascus steel.

A further practical concern is the need for appropriate communication architectures to allow the JTF staff to easily communicate within the varied service networks. One mechanism that proved to be very valuable in the Kosovo operation is video teleconferencing (VTC).<sup>47</sup> This permitted real time coordination over long distances of several command elements. Use of VTCs is an example of how new technology can provide faster and clearer communication between echelons of command and can therefore facilitate the consolidation and flattening of command structures. In the long term, greater emphasis must be given to creating communications systems that are better designed for seamless integration across service boundaries. Until better acquisition processes deliver mutually compatible devices, the emphasis will be upon the J6 directorate of the joint force to make the appropriate adaptations to link the varied service communications mechanisms.

This proposal raises a potential concern regarding the span of control for joint task force commanders. Instead of using service and functional component commanders to manage forces under his control, the JTF commander would have greater direct control of service and functional elements. The increased size and complexity of the SJTF HQ places greater responsibility directly on the JTF commander. Under this proposal, however, the span of control does not really change, rather, the locus of action moves from the compartmentalized service or functional component headquarters to the better integrated joint staff under the JTF commander. Furthermore, it does not change the fact that there are service component commanders at the unified combatant command level with whom the JTF commander can coordinate to support his specific mission. This proposal also does not *preclude* the

establishment of service or functional component commands. Although discouraged in order to prevent the proliferation of command echelons, there may be times when the size or scope of a particular service or function would benefit from the assignment of an additional commander. The main difference is that the JTF commander would not be *required* to do so, as presently mandated.<sup>48</sup>

A key point is that the successful management and implementation of this proposal is also a function of the qualifications and experience of the service representatives on the joint task force staff. More intimate working relationships on this joint staff will be a function of a shared joint culture. It will also serve as a mechanism to reinforce joint culture development. It does not represent the death of unique service cultures. Ultimately, the foundation of effective integration of a joint staff rests upon foundations of service expertise and the unique service perspectives resident on the staff. An analogous situation is the Army combined arms team that is enriched by the branch loyalties and branch perspectives developed over a series of formative tactical experiences.<sup>49</sup> In a similar fashion, service representatives must have a well developed expertise in their service before they can be effective advocates and integrators at the joint staff level.

### ***Critical Joint Enablers***

General Clark noted that the absence of joint skills was a significant problem during the NATO air war against Serbia.

The discrete service programs didn't always fit together technically. And the officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. Far greater attention is required in this area. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers.<sup>50</sup>

To remedy this, the joint professional military education (JPME) system and the emphasis on joint duty assignments form two critical enablers in the effective implementation of the recommendations I have

presented. The first enabler is JPME's critical role to inculcate in service experts a clear understanding of the complementary capabilities of the all the services. Second is the extensive experience in joint operations that joint duty assignments facilitate. Through joint command and joint staff assignments, we can generate greater trust and understanding among officers from various services. Detailed consideration of these enablers is beyond the scope of this paper, however, there is no doubt that they are an integral part of any successful effort to improve joint command and control.

There is one important caveat. There is no intent in any of this to create joint staff officers or joint staff elements divorced completely from the Services. The recommendations I present can be accomplished using the current joint service duty system—albeit with a reduced reliance on waivers. These recommendations do not envision the creation of purple-suited, joint officers similar to the classic German General staff system. The improvements I suggest rely on well qualified officers of the military services who are simply brought together more closely to integrate the actions of their services in joint operations.

## **Conclusion**

To achieve more successful joint integration and orchestration—and not just coordination—we need to improve the structure for command and control of joint operations. We can accomplish this by creating standing joint task force headquarters with a strong, well-trained cohesive structure that can rapidly and effectively assume control of diverse service units for mission execution. With the stronger training and capabilities of this standing headquarters, there is also less need for additional layers of command and control at the operational level. Hence, standing joint task forces—and any other JTF—should not be required to have service or component commanders.

ENDNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 30 September 30, 2001), 32.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001, III-9 to III-11.

<sup>3</sup> Public Law 99-443, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 October 1986.

<sup>4</sup> For a brief summary of the history behind the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see James R. Locher III, "Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," Naval War College Review, LIV, no 4 (Autumn 2001): 95-115.

<sup>5</sup> Locher, 106-108.

<sup>6</sup> As the after action report on the Persian Gulf War noted, "CINCCENT's [Schwarzkopf] style of leadership gave considerable leeway to subordinate commanders." Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Washington D.C., April 1992, 553.

<sup>7</sup> Service component commands included Army component, Central Command (ARCENT) comprised of US Third Army (which commanded XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps). Navy Component (NAVCENT) comprised of US Seventh Fleet and the Marine amphibious task force afloat. Marine Component (MARCENT) consisted of 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary force (1 MEF). Air Force component (CENTAF) also served as Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and commanded all USAF units in theater. CINC CENTCOM (General Schwarzkopf) made a conscious decision to maintain the responsibility as land component commander (JFLCC) directly. Therefore, land forces of the Marines, Army and coalition reported to him separately. Coalition forces remained under the command of their national authorities, although CINC CENTCOM did receive operational control of United Kingdom and other western military forces and tactical control of French Forces. Islamic nations authorized Saudi Arabia to exercise command of their forces under what was know at the Joint Force/Theater of Operations. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 43-44, 545-558.

<sup>8</sup> Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995), 432.

<sup>9</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 417.

<sup>10</sup> For details of the original war plan and the commander's intent, including delineation of main and secondary attacks, see Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 231.

<sup>11</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 471-473.

<sup>12</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 412-413.

<sup>13</sup> See Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 181. "Ground force commanders expressed discontent with the JFACC targeting process for not being responsive to pre G-day [ground war start day] targeting nominations....Difficulties were experienced in nominating and validating targets. CINCCENT has recommended, for future major military operations, the JFACC be staffed with personnel from all using as well as providing Services."

<sup>14</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 412-413.

<sup>15</sup> The creation of JTF Noble Anvil evolved from US-only planning efforts begun in 1998 as events in Kosovo began to deteriorate. Initial structures included a Navy-run JTF to focus on the possible use of cruise missiles only for strikes (JTF Flexible Anvil, under Commander Sixth Fleet, VAdm Murphy) and an Air Force-run JTF for the possible use of manned aircraft for strikes (JTF Sky Anvil, under Commander 16<sup>th</sup> AF, Lt Gen Short). Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report. (Washington DC, 31 January 2000), 16-21.

<sup>16</sup> The choice of US NAVEUR HQ and its structure as the core for JTF Noble Anvil were explained to me by Colonel Patrick Sweeney, former J5 HQ AFSOUTH during Operation Allied Force and Commander Jeff Barker, Acting N3, US NAVEUR during Operation Allied Force. Interviews by the author, 1 February 2002. Concerns about this structure were also noted by Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander JTF Noble Anvil, in a PowerPoint presentation provided to me by Commander Barker. PowerPoint presentation, "A View From the Top." Date was unspecified but it clearly took place after Operation Allied Force. Other headquarters in Europe that had been previously trained and certified for JTF headquarters missions included Headquarters Southern European Task Force (US Army), US Army V Corps HQ, US 16<sup>th</sup> AF HQ, US 3<sup>rd</sup> AF HQ and, US Sixth Fleet HQ. These headquarters were identified by Colonel Patrick Sweeney, interview with author, 1 February 2002.



<sup>17</sup> Interview with Commander Barker, 1 February 2002 and Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 111.

<sup>18</sup> For details on command relationships during the operations in Kosovo, see General Clark's Waging Modern War, New York: Public Affairs, 2001 and Douglas MacGregor, "The Joint Force: A Decade, No Progress." Joint Forces Quarterly no. 27 (Winter 00-01): 18-23.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, (Washington DC, 31 January, 2000), 76.

<sup>20</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report, 20.

<sup>21</sup> For one description of different intelligence sources integrated into the air operation, see Lt Gen Short's comments contained in Elaine M. Grossman, "Short: U.S., NATO Lacked Clear Political Objectives in Kosovo War." Inside the Pentagon, 25 May 2000, 1.

<sup>22</sup> General Wesley Clark was the Commander in chief of U.S. European Command (CINC EUCOM) as well as being the commander of all NATO armed forces in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

<sup>23</sup> Similar to General Clark, Admiral Ellis was dual-hatted. In the U.S. chain of command he was commander of U.S. Navy Europe and in his NATO capacity is was commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).

<sup>24</sup> A major difficulty with the Kosovo operation is that the air operations, under NATO command, were under the direct supervision of Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) commanded by USN Admiral Jim Ellis. Task Force Hawk remained under U.S. operational control outside of the NATO chain of command. The commander of Task Force Hawk was the U.S. Army V Corps Commander, LTG John Hendrix, who was directly responsible to General Clark in his capacity as Commander in Chief U.S. European Command.

<sup>25</sup> Clark, 329.

<sup>26</sup> In this case, the supported commander would have been the air commander, LtGen Short (JFACC) in Italy. He was commander of the main effort. Ground forces introduced later could have been assigned in support of his command.

<sup>27</sup> For a good description of the diversity principle in joint operations, see Robert Rubel, "Principles of Jointness," Joint Forces Quarterly no. 27 (Winter 00-01): 47.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations, Figure I-3, p. I-8.

<sup>29</sup> General Anthony Zinni provided several illustrations of this in his description of the multiple US and UN command and control arrangements from 1992-1994. For example, he described how difficult it was to get a guarantee that there would be no raids or other operations during a time when he would be negotiating face to face with individuals from one of the Somali factions. He needed to coordinate separately with the overall UN command and its ostensibly subordinate US component. Within the US component, he had to coordinate separately with the US commander, the Special forces element commander, and a Marine element off shore. Even so, an American psychological operations unit conducted a leaflet drop during his negotiations (PSYOPS was a sub-element of the US special operations element). From Zinni presentation to CIA audience, 6 March 1996.

<sup>30</sup> Geographically, the air sector is divided between ground and air forces through use of a Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) established by the ground commander. This is a line beyond which no additional coordination is required with the land commander for attack of targets. In practice, this is the line beyond which the air component commander has the authority to attack targets. See Gordon and Trainor, 412-413.

<sup>31</sup> 2001 QDR, pp. 33-34.

<sup>32</sup> I have tried to determine the current status of the DOD effort to meet this charter. I have determined who is directing this action, (COL (ret) Chess Harris at the Joint Forces Staff College), however, I have been unable to get in direct contact and find out more about the proposals being considered, their status, and likely release date.

<sup>33</sup> For a description of the circumstance appropriate for the creation of a JTF and the benefits of a JTF, see Joint Publication 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, V-9 to V-10.

<sup>34</sup> Douglas A. MacGregor, "The Joint Force: A Decade, No Progress." Joint Forces Quarterly no. 27 (Winter 00-01), 20. Also see George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri and Adam B. Siegel, JTF Operations Since 1983, CRM 94-42, Washington D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1994.

<sup>35</sup> For details on methods for organization of JTF HQ, see Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, especially Chapter II, II-1 to II-5.

<sup>36</sup> Otto Kreisher, "The Quest for Jointness," Air Force Magazine (September 2001), 74.

<sup>37</sup> Joint critical billets are designated in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Officers designated as joint service officers must have completed a joint duty assignment and joint professional military education (JPME). Current rules permit waivers of JPME and JDA requirements for some flag officers. See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director, Manpower & Personnel, A Guide to Joint Officer Management, Washington DC, January 1988.

<sup>38</sup> The parallel to this would be the relationship of an Army division's main and tactical operations center. In garrison, the members of the main and tactical operations centers share offices and work together to accomplish a variety of tasks. During division tactical operations, the two elements separate and operate from different locations. The tactical operations center (DTAC) is usually the smaller and operates closer to the front lines. It is primarily concerned with current operations—in combat, that translates in to command and control of the close battle. The division main operations center (DMAIN) is much larger and generally remains further back from the front lines. The DMAIN is more concerned with future operations as well as coordination with higher headquarters and adjacent units. In smaller deployments or exercises involving a subset of the division, it is not uncommon for the DTAC to deploy for command and control of the operation while the DMAIN remains to command and control non-deployed elements. In combination, the elements form a robust team that can manage the complex demands of the division in peace and war. The beauty of the arrangement is the redundant capacity for command and control that provides the division a tremendous degree of tactical flexibility.

<sup>39</sup> One limitation on JTFs is that a JTF must rely on service components of the unified command for logistics. As currently written, doctrine requires all echelons of joint forces to include service components. The primary justification for this is the service specific logistics systems. "All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint operations is provided through Service component commands." Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, II-15.

<sup>40</sup> The positions on this staff will be joint duty assignments that will support the JSO designation process. The individuals assigned from each service should be strong individuals with demonstrated potential for further service and promotion within their services. For example, O5 and O6 positions should be filled by critical occupation specialty (COS), command-rated officers from each of the services.

<sup>41</sup> Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 16 July 1997. p. 443

<sup>42</sup> Augmentees from other combatant commands, particularly the functional unified commands, would be particularly appropriate for high demand, low density specialties that are critical in times of crisis. For example, certain intelligence analysts and strategic transportation managers. In a crisis, augmentation by individuals in the training base—typically part of Joint Forces Command—is also likely to provide important value added to the JTF HQ that would not necessarily be cost effective to provide in all regional combatant commands in the absence of a crisis or major operation.

<sup>43</sup> For a general description of Network Centric Warfare, see David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, (Washington D.C.: CCRP Publication Series), 1999.

<sup>44</sup> Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, V-3.

<sup>45</sup> Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, 81.

<sup>46</sup> For example, the Army cell of the J3 might include Infantry, Armor and Artillery representatives. The Navy cell might include surface, submarine and aviation representatives. The Air Force cell might include fighter, bomber and space representatives.

<sup>47</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report, 28-29. The report notes, "NATO commanders used video teleconferencing for the first time as a instrument for exercising command and control. Daily commanders' teleconferences were held to review progress of operations, coordinate future operations, and promulgate intentions. These conferences spanned the chain of command from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to the Commander Joint Task Force and onward to component commanders. In other words, these commanders' video teleconferences spanned the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command, thus greatly

compressing normal command-and-control processes. As a result, strategic and operational commanders were able to directly influence tactical operations.”

<sup>48</sup> This same structure could also be applied at the unified command level. Focus would be on the creation of a robust, joint staff with service components elements reduced to focus on the specific training and logistics functions in support of service specific forces that will be integrated into the joint force.

<sup>49</sup> US Army branches represent the broad specialties of the Army force. Combat arms branches include the Infantry, Armor, Aviation and Artillery. Other branches include Signal Corps, Engineers, Air Defense Artillery and a variety of combat service support specialties such as Personnel, Quartermaster and Ordnance. Units at Brigade level and above routinely integrate the capabilities of most if not all Army branches.

<sup>50</sup> Clark, 459.

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